and Senator Leverett Saltonstall. 10 No doubt his ideological vacuity and background in urban politics where labor and ethnicity figured prominently primed Colson for his "hard hat" assignment.
Although Meany had a well-deserved reputation as a hawk on Vietnam and rarely missed an opportunity to criticize the antiwar movement, Colson made little headway with the union chief. Nixon himself did not help the cause. At their first White House meeting, Meany found the president annoyingly eager to please and "sort of exuberant, sort of bounding around." As he ushered the labor chief out of the Oval Office, Nixon stopped to introduce his secretary, Rose Mary Woods. "She's a Catholic, too, George," the president commented. The obsequious comment, an example of the president's awkward pandering and unsophisticated identity politics, backfired. Meany later recalled his irritation. "What the hell was that? As if that was important to me! What the hell did I care what she was." Meany had similar trouble warming up to other Nixon officials. Attorney General John Mitchell, Meany complained, greeted him like a "lump of granite, no smile on his face. "11 Nor did Nixon's initial foreign policy impress the hawkish Meany. The AFLCIO president complained to National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger that he was "appalled at the lack of discipline in the new administration as evidenced by conflicting statements" on Vietnam.12 Jay Lovestone, head of the AFL-CIO's international affairs department, echoed Meany's concerns, fearing the new "administration would be inclined to flee from the Asian theater" and complaining bitterly of Nixon's "bookkeeping attitude on foreign assistance." 13 Colson hardly enjoyed more success with the rank and file. He appears to have whittled away his first several months of work seeking out some grand symbolic event or gesture to attract the interest of blue-collar workers. By the summer of 1970, Colson felt he had seized upon something. "I have finally, after many months of work produced a Catholic, veteran, hard-hat all in one," reported Colson to Press Secretary Ron Ziegler. "He is obviously the answer to all our problems and I can have him jump out of the box any time."14 In Colson's "box" was one Benjamin M. Garcia, who volunteered to drive his ride-on lawnmower from New York City to the White House. There, he planned to deliver a petition signed by one million voters in support for Nixon's policies, after which he apparently planned to cut the South Lawn, possibly with the president on board. Few even among Nixon's supporters could take the scheme seriously. Told of Garcia's plans, Lyn Nofzinger, Republican National Committee communications director, quipped, "It will be a sod thing if this doesn't pan out."15 In the end, Garcia, largely ignored by the media, arrived at the White House only to be met by a presidential aide who accepted the petition. 16 The Garcia escapade reflected the extent to which Colson's blue-collar mission overlapped with another of his charges -that of recruiting the support of supposedly "unmelted" white ethnic communities nestled in urban areas. 17 Informed by an awkward combination of simplistic stereotypes and a rudimentary sense of identity politics, Colson set out to cultivate "nationalities" by appealing to mutually shared values -however nebulous. In the case of Italian Americans, for instance, Colson urged the president to ban the Justice Department from using the terms "mafia" and "costa nostra." Before a scheduled White House meeting with leaders of the Sons of Italy, Colson counseled the president to bemoan the "so-called intellectual elite who want to tear down our institutions" and talk "about patriotism generally . . . about this group's devotion to community and family."18 The administration's strategy, it appeared, focused largely on stoking group resentment rather than cultivating any true appreciation of ethnic heritage.
For help, Colson turned to the Republican National Committee's Heritage Groups Division, which supplied him with a thick "set of nationality folders containing statistical data, press and radio listings, nationality organizations, [ Beyond keeping Colson busy, none of his schemes bore any real fruit. There is no record, for instance, of Volpe responding to Colson's requests. Beyond general incompetence, other roadblocks hampered Colson's progress. The White House's political initiatives, in particular, often seemed to work at cross purposes. Early in his presidency, Nixon's Labor Department had pressed the so-called Philadelphia Plan, designed to reform traditionally nepotistic, racist employment practices in the construction trades industries. Nixon's intent appears to have been to seek African American support and drive a wedge between liberals and labor leaders. Whatever the motive, the Philadelphia Plan, named for a prototype program begun in the city of brotherly love, infuriated labor leaders, who quickly made their displeasure public; the president then began furiously backpedaling. At a meeting with an assembly of construction trades union leaders in the spring of 1970, Nixon awkwardly insisted he favored only a "voluntary approach," not a mandatory, heavily regulated affirmative action program. "While not backing away from our support for the Philadelphia Plan," the president told the assemblage, "we, too, favor these 'home town' solutions." Nixon then obsequiously outlined plans for a committee to "devote attention to one of our great national needs -the need to restore pride in a craft and to promote the dignity of skilled labor."22
The on-again, off-again Philadelphia Plan hardly stood as the only example of poor coordination on the part of the White House's political arm. Alongside the blue-collar strategy, Nixon, in his early days in office, launched a number of initiatives designed to woo traditionally Democratic voters, including Latinos, southern whites, blacks, and urban ethnic voters.23 Yet a similar slovenliness marked each new initiative. By executive order in March 1969, for instance, Nixon created the Office of Minority Business Enterprise, to encourage "black capitalism" programs the president felt sure would be popular among the growing black middle class.24 Just as these projects were getting off the ground, however, Nixon short-circuited them with the nomination to the Supreme Court of South Carolinian Clement F. Haynsworth Jr., whose record, to be generous, seemed to reflect ambivalence to desegregation. Nixon and his advisors, of course, designed the Haynsworth and follow-up nomination of Harold Carswell as the centerpiece of another political strategy -that of cultivating white southern support. 25 The Haynsworth and Carswell imbroglios were perhaps also an effort to build on a political theme that had worked well for Nixon (and upstart candidate George Wallace) during the 1968 campaign -law and order. Although never specific, Nixon promised strong initiatives aimed at "stopping the rising crime rate and for reestablishing freedom from fear." But the issue faded once Nixon was in office, partly because the Nixonites discovered, as historian Michael Flamm explains, that "controlling crime was more difficult than they [rhetorical advocates of law and order] had led the American people to believe."26 Short of Nixon aide Bud Krogh's ride-alongs with the Washington, DC, police, the issue received increasingly little attention.27
In many ways, the Nixon administration was pursuing what later critics would identify as the most unfortunate characteristics of identity politics -an essentialist approach in which appeals to gross stereotypes substituted for substantive policy initiatives. But the administration's implementation of its political initiatives proved so ill-executed and transparent that they fell largely on deaf ears.28
Yet even as the White House and Colson appeared to have hit rock bottom, events already were conspiring in their favor. The catalyst providing sudden life to the blue-collar strategy was Nixon's controversial invasion of Cambodia. The uproar that came with the incursion caught the White House off guard. Killings at Kent State University and Jackson State College clearly rattled the administration. Bitter protests seemed to spring from every corner of the country; however, pro-war elements in U.S. organized labor -located in particular at the helm of the AFL-CIO and in the construction trades unions -deeply appreciated what they saw as tough, appropriate action.29
The hawkishness of the AFL-CIO leadership and many -although by no means all -union members was very much in keeping with the anticommunism of postwar liberalism. Key union leaders, like many liberals committed to international development, believed the Cold War required more than just an arms buildup: it required a holistic commitment to economic, social, and political development in areas of the world threatened by communism. Guided by a sense that such development required, in particular, the development of "free," independent trade unions, organized labor became deeply involved in foreign affairs. 30 The AFL, CIO, and subsequent AFL-CIO had established a well-connected network of foreign policy operatives around the world, often working in league with the Central Intelligence Agency and other official U.S. agencies. These concerns hung over Meany as he arrived for his first visit to the Nixon White House -the same meeting where the president had so annoyed him with the comment about his secretary being a fellow Catholic. Despite that road bump, the pair had devoted two-thirds of their meeting to a wide-ranging discussion of the state of the world. Meany lobbied the president "at length about the AFL-CIO program of training union leaders." Gratifyingly, Nixon "expressed interest and support for continuation of the [labor] program."34 Relieved that AAFLI and his other programs were safe, Meany and most labor leaders nevertheless remained wary of Nixon.
However, the president's invasion of Cambodia, in particular his defiant insistence the United States would not act "like a helpless, pitiful giant," suddenly turned everything around. Jay Lovestone was so impressed that he arranged the clandestine meeting with Colson described in the opening of this article. Unbeknownst to Meany, after their initial May 5th rendezvous, Colson and Lovestone began meeting regularly. The two arranged for Nixon personally to brief the federation's Executive Council on Cambodian developments, a briefing at which the president received a particularly warm welcome. 35 As the pair connived, a series of spontaneous pro-war rallies in New York City by so-called hard hat construction workers excited the interest of Lovestone and Colson. The counterdemonstrations began on May 8, when construction workers attacked peace protesters in Manhattan, allegedly in retaliation for an act of desecration against the American flag; related protests quickly flared in other cities. 36 In New York City, the hard hats, basking in media attention, began holding daily demonstrations in the city's financial district. Union leaders -in particular ambitious Peter Brennan, president of the Building and Construction Trades Council of Greater New York -seized control of the previously spontaneous protests.37
In many ways, the hard-hat riots better reflected a general outpouring of worker discontent and militancy than a specific endorsement of Nixon. Already a wave of major strikes had washed across the country. Most notably in late 1969, 147,000 electrical workers walked off their jobs at General Electric for 102 days. The following year, 394,000 members of the United Auto Workers (UAW), demanding double-digit percentage wage increases to counterbalance rising inflation, which the UAW specifically blamed on Nixon, waged a two-month-long bitter strike against General Motors.38 Like the rest of the country, blue-collar workers seemed swept up in an ill-focused spirit of rebellion.
Yet to Colson and Lovestone, the hard hat rallies offered an alluring political opportunity to counterbalance flaring antiwar protests around the country. Through Lovestone, Colson urged Brennan and others to organize a major, highly publicized, pro-war rally to be held May 20 simultaneously in several cities. Hard hat leaders needed little prompting. Brennan and construction union leaders eagerly organized the massive demonstration.39 In New York City, the May 20 march drew between 100,000 and 150,000 protesters; smaller rallies took place in San Diego, Pittsburgh, Buffalo, and other cities.40
In an overt effort to align himself closer with the hard-hat demonstrations, Nixon invited its organizers to the White House for a "serious, in-depth briefing on the situation in Cambodia." As cameras snapped, Brennan presented Nixon with a hard hat, a "symbol of our support for our fighting men and for your efforts in trying to bring the war to a proper conclusion. In reality, however, Nixon had made little headway. Neither Nixon's cultural outreach campaign nor his invasion of Cambodia appeared capable of cutting the apron strings between the Democratic Party and union members -as the results of the 1970 congressional elections quickly made manifest. In the buildup to the election, defying Nixon's courtship, trade unions and the rank and file pumped millions of dollars into the campaign coffers of Democratic candidates, a trend that was "interpreted by many labor leaders that blue collar workers are not turning conservative."53 That November Democrats added nine seats to their majority in the House of Representatives and three seats in the Senate. "GOP Aimed Campaign Strategy at Wrong Group" blared a Washington Post headline in the election's aftermath. Noting the success of Pennsylvania gubernatorial candidate Milton Shapp, who won 91 percent of the labor vote, pollster George Gallup concluded that Nixon had bet too much that the "hard hat or otherwise was angry, frustrated and bitter at national conditions and ready to switch parties." Economic priorities stressed by Democrats, Gallup explained, had triumphed over the amorphous "law-and-order" cultural campaign mounted by Republicans for union voters.54 If any in the White House had thought their cultural campaign was making headway, they now had definitive evidence to the contrary.
Angered by the election results, some in the White House called for the abandonment of the blue-collar strategy. Nixon's chief speechwriter, Jim Keogh, labeled Colson's work "a mistake" and complained that after the Labor Day dinner, union bosses "went out and bludgeoned us with rhetoric and money." Worse, he argued, the Colson mission was fatally flawed in its assumption that union leaders and members saw things the same way. "I hold the belief," insisted Keogh, "that even rank-and-file labor union members tend to look with suspicion on big labor leaders."55
The blue-collar strategy that had briefly taken flight following the Cambodian invasion now lay in ruins by the end of 1970 -and the following year was to bring no revival. As U.S. troop withdrawals quickened, the war in Indochina "virtually disappeared as a campaign issue."56 For organized labor, a new crisis took center stage -the sliding economy. In 1971, unemployment shot up almost two percentage points to approach 6 percent. Meanwhile, stagflation -stagnant wages and rising prices -first reared its ugly head as the cost of living inched upward, accompanied by rising unemployment. The hard hats were hardest hit. By mid-1971, unemployment among construction workers stood at twice the national average with some trades edging toward 50 percent unemployment.57
The souring economy became a bone of bitter contention between Nixon and almost the entire organized labor movement. Meany, insisting that "the only game plan for America is full employment," relentlessly flayed Nixon's handling of the economy, prescribing instead expanded federal spending to address the downturn. 58 Within the White House, however, organized labor increasingly became a fall guy for inflation and economic trouble. "Our problems come because of the high wages demanded by the workers of this country," complained White House eco nomic advisor Arthur Burns.59 Likewise, Council of Economic Advisors Chairman Paul McCracken worried "the construction industry continues to cause us extremely serious problems in our attempts to reduce inflation. Wage increases appear to be accelerating instead of subsiding." 60 Far from cultivating labor, some in the Nixon administration increasingly moved to scapegoat blue-collar workers.
Nixon's August 1971 announcement of price and wage controls further fueled mounting hostility between labor and the White House. To many trade unionists, the announcement seemed a negation of a key principle of postwar liberalism -"full employment," an offshoot of Keynesian economics, in which aggressive fiscal spending became the prescription for economic growth. As such, Meany promptly positioned himself as the leading critic of price and wage controls. He pounded the Nixon plan as "an assertion of dictatorial power completely foreign to the American concept of freedom." 61 When Nixon appeared before the AFL-CIO biannual convention in November 1971, Meany and the assemblage was dismissive, borderline rude, to the president.62 For more than a year, Meany spewed venom at Nixon, at one point calling the plan "a tax bonanza to American corporations at the expense of American workers." 63 His attacks on Nixon drew rare praise from the media in the process. Yet even as tensions threatened to boil over, Vietnam remained a point of commonality between the administration and many in organized labor. In 1971, for instance, on the eve of a national presidential television address on Vietnam, National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger journeyed the several blocks between the White House and AFL-CIO headquarters to privately brief Meany on the contents of the speech. "I know you've got your problems on the economy but we appreciate your support in this area," Kissinger told the labor chieftain. "It involves the fabric of our country and maybe, if we do not succeed, the country won't be worth being President of." Meany readily concurred and complained of the damage done by recent revelations regarding the My Lai massacre -"the result of this peacenik-sort of pounding of the press," according to the labor chief. Meany and Kissinger then swapped stories about facing down antiwar demonstrators on college campuses, Kissinger at MIT and Meany at Randolph-Macon College. "I think the professors are worse than the students," opined Meany to the former Harvard University faculty member. 72 In the face of stiffening opposition to the war, the administration and the AFL-CIO leadership still relied upon each other for mutual support. Meany grew increasingly annoyed as McGovern's unfolding campaign showed no sign of moderation (while revealing ample signs of disorganization). Following the well-managed Republican convention, Meany asked George Shultz for a private meeting. Avoiding a direct endorsement, the AFL-CIO president carefully reviewed for Nixon's treasury secretary how the president might appeal to trade unionists. Despite his doubts about détente (of which he always remained a critic), Meany thought Nixon to be "perfect on foreign policy." Although a supporter of civil rights, Meany explained he had come to appreciate Nixon's reservations on busing. On the controversial topic of defense spending, the AFL-CIO president, a strong proponent of Keynesian spending, commended the president for emphasizing national security without connecting the issue to jobs. Workers, Meany explained, understand the importance of defense spending, but to speak openly about its economic impact would "just undermine the national security argument." In the margins of John Ehrlichman's transcript of the meeting, Nixon scribbled "right" alongside Meany's advice.83 Still, Nixon, eager to make defense spending an issue to attract working Democrats, ordered the Defense Department to prepare a general report on the relationship between military spending and economic growth. The resulting study, The Economics of Defense, essentially made the case for military Keynesianism by predicting difficult times should McGovern get his defense cuts. 84 In stump speeches, Nixon, adopting Meany's counsel, never openly linked defense spending and employment, but the Defense Department's report performed that task for the president. The issue of defense jobs, clearly related to the AFL-CIO's full-employment economic strategy and the war in Southeast Asia, hung over the campaign. In the wake of Watergate and the economic collapse of 1973, the blue-collar strategy essentially died -mourned by virtually no one. Hardly the product of "cultural vision" or sensitivity to supposedly underlying class tensions, the blue-collar strategy was less sophisticated, ultimately operating only in fits and starts. The unique politics of the Vietnam War, in particular the AFL-CIO's heavy investment in a South Vietnamese labor movement, briefly enlivened the strategy and (alongside the incompetence of the McGovern campaign) perhaps helped Nixon win the 1972 election. With the Vietnam issue removed from the table briefly in 1971 and then permanently in 1973, the strategy -for both union leaders and the rank and file -floundered. Never again would trade union leaders come as close to endorsing a Republican president as they had in 1972.
Some have argued that Nixon's blue-collar strategy set the stage for the rise of the so-called Reagan Democrats a decade later -that while the president failed in cultivating the leadership, he made gains with the rank and file.91 But the 1970 and 1972 elections hardly suggested potential realignment. Rather, the majority of workers and trade union leaders remained wedded to the postwar liberal agenda of activist anticommunism abroad and full-employment economics at home. Facing McGovern in 1972, Nixon essentially seized that agenda by promising a strong foreign policy and promoting military Keynesianism. Beyond this, Nixon never made a serious attempt to overcome the cultural and ideological gulf separating him and the organized labor movement, and never moved to provide working families with any serious safeguards as they entered a period of prolonged economic challenges. Without the Vietnam War, the blue-collar strategy would have remained a figment of Charles Colson's imagination -and even with the war, it proved to be little more.
Revisionists who praise Nixon's cultural sensitivity are correct on at least one account: the president and his political advisors did think inordinately in terms of group identity -and they were hardly alone. By the late 1960s, many on the far left no longer adhered to the once-ubiquitous principles of liberal universalism -the belief that all, regardless of race, gender, or ethnicity, shared an essential common humanity. Instead of moving beyond group identity, advocacy groups for African Americans, women, and others began espousing a new politics grounded in group membership. Identity politics remains the dominant political philosophy of our times. Nixon obviously shared little in common with most of this rising mentality.92 Yet in his political machinations -often grounded in simplistic stereotypes such as in the case of the blue-collar strategy -Nixon and his aides engaged the worst elements of identity politics.93
Footnotes

